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ALEC ZUO, SARAH ANN WHEELER, W.L. (VIC) ADAMOWICZ,
PETER C. BOXALL, AND DARLA HATTON-MACDONALD
Estimates of price elasticities of water entitlements (known as permanent water or water rights in
the United States) are complicated by data limitations and problems of endogeneity. To overcome
these issues, we develop an approach to generate stated preference data and combine them with
revealed preference data to estimate price elasticities from various types of water entitlement
sales in the southern Murray-Darling Basin, Australia. Our results suggest that price elasticities of
demand and supply of high security water entitlements are inelastic in the relevant market price
range between AUD $1,700 to $2,100 per mega-liter, and that supply is relatively more inelastic
than demand. For lower reliability water entitlements, the price elasticity of demand is estimated
to be even more inelastic than high security water entitlements. The price elasticity of supply
for general security water entitlements is similar to high security water entitlements, while the
supply of low reliability water entitlements is extremely inelastic for our data set. The comparison
between the stated and revealed preference data provides strong evidence of support for a data
fusion approach; nevertheless, some differences in water sale preferences were found for irrigators
choosing not to sell all of their water. The consistency of our results signals support for the use of
this methodology in other water basins around the world.
Key words: Contingent behavior, irrigation, price elasticity, water entitlements, water markets.
JEL codes: Q21, Q25.
Irrigated agriculture is the largest water user
in many countries in the world (World Water
Assessment Programme 2012). Thus, under-
standing irrigators’ responsiveness to changes
in water prices is essential for evaluating
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various environmental and economic policy
initiatives. Initiatives designed to address
potential water shortages include: a) regu-
latory approaches such as restrictions and
limits on water use, licenses, abstraction, and
allocations; b) economic instruments such
as water markets, charges, tariffs, and water
pricing, as well as subsidization of water
infrastructure or insurance schemes; and c)
informational and other instruments such
as education, meter water use, institutional
changes, and cooperative/planning agree-
ments (Griffin 2006). Information on price
elasticities associated with some of the largest
users of water is an important component for
assessing these policy options.
Despite agricultural water markets being in
existence for many years around the world,
there is a lack of empirical studies on price
elasticities (especially water entitlements)
in water markets. This is mainly because of
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a paucity of water trade data, unavailability
of price information, and a lack of water
entitlement trade in general, in contrast to
temporary or seasonal trade. Inherent in
market transaction data are problems such
as endogeneity between water prices and
water supply/demand, variability in unob-
served contextual characteristics, etc. To
overcome having insufficient data and varia-
tion in observations of the same commodity
at various price levels, we design a stated
preference tool to elicit water demand and
supply preferences, and administer it to
irrigators in the southern Murray-Darling
Basin (MDB) in Australia. This survey also
collected irrigators’ historical water market
trade information, which allowed us to com-
pare between hypothetical and actual trading
information.
The MDB provides an excellent opportu-
nity to experimentally examine water supply
and demand elasticities because of its strong
and well-established water institutions. Water
markets were first established in Australia
in the 1980s, with significant water reform,
both urban and rural, introduced in the early
1990s (Council of Australian Governments
1994), and renewed with the introduction of
the National Water Initiative (NWI 2004).
Although water markets have been adopted
in other countries around the world (e.g.,
Chile, the United States, Mexico, and China),
Australian water markets are considered
the most advanced and sophisticated, with
official markets having been in operation
for three decades (Grafton et al. 2011). In
particular, our case study region—the MDB
in Australia—comprised 94% of the volume
of entitlements and allocations traded across
Australia 2010–12 (NWC 2011b, 2013).1
1 Land and water were initially unbundled in Australia, state by
state between the early 1990s and early 2000s. Water rights were
unbundled in the 2000s, which resulted in the water license being
split into four categories: (i) an access right to receive seasonal
allocations; (ii) a volumetric seasonal allocation credited to an
allocation account; (iii) a water use right that allows the holder
to extract the allocation and put it to a defined use; and (iv) a
delivery capacity right which allows for the delivery of allocations.
All of these (except the water use right) can be traded separately.
There are two main water markets in Australia: a) trade of water
entitlements (permanent water access right of (i) above); and b)
trade of water allocations (known as temporary seasonal trade
in Australia or as lease trade in other country jurisdictions, and
is the (ii) above) (NWC 2013). To irrigate, a farmer needs an
allocation (from own water access right or bought from the
allocation market), a water use right to extract the allocation,
and a delivery capacity right, but does not need any access rights
because they can buy temporary allocation water (ACCC 2010).
Many irrigators who choose to sell all their water access rights
keep their right to have water delivered (Wheeler and Cheesman
This article describes a contingent behav-
ior experiment where stated preferences
for buying and selling different types of
water entitlements at various price levels
are elicited and compared with actual water
market trading history. Our survey differs
from contingent valuation studies, which
typically seek to find values associated with a
marginal change in an environmental good.
Instead, we investigate contingent sale and
purchase quantities of a private good that
irrigators have considerable experience with
in Australia, that is, the buying and selling of
water. We are interested in examining how
elasticity differs between buying and selling
entitlements (by differing types of security)
across regions and farm types. We also pro-
vide a comparison of stated and revealed
preferences for water entitlement sales and
offer valuable insights into the relationship
between the two approaches and the validity
of our experiment. The consistency of our
results signals strong support for the use
of this methodology in other water basins
around the world.
Case Study Area: Murray-Darling Basin
The MDB is located in southeastern
Australia (see figure 1), and includes parts of
the states of Queensland, New South Wales
(NSW), Victoria (VIC), South Australia
(SA), and all of the Australian Capital Ter-
ritory. The MDB has the largest amount
of irrigated agricultural land in Australia
and uses more than half of the irrigation
water applied nationally. The primary uses
of irrigation water in the MDB are the pro-
duction of cotton, pasture for grazing, other
cereals for grain or seed, and fruit (ABS
2013).
Most water trade occurs in the southern
MDB water market, which is hydrologically
linked across states (this means water can be
transferred from one state to another) and
constrained by a variety of defined trading
rules, legislation, and water plans.2 Irrigators
in the MDB can trade two types of water: a)
2013). Irrigators who operate within an irrigation district are
known as district irrigators, as compared to a private irrigator,
who are responsible for all their own infrastructure and pumping
surface water direct from a river (or a groundwater bore).
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Figure 1. Murray-Darling Basin in Australia
Source: http://www.abc.net.au/site-archive/rural/murraydarling/map-large.png.
water entitlements that can be high security
(HS, in NSW, Victoria, and SA), general
security (GS, mainly in NSW), or low secu-
rity (LS, mainly in Victoria); and b) water
allocations for seasonal temporary water.
Trading on the water market is now fairly
common: over 30% of seasonal water and
10% of water entitlements are traded in
the southern MDB (NWC 2011b). Wheeler
et al. (2014) estimated that at least 55% of
irrigators have traded temporary water and
25% permanent water since official south-
ern MDB water trades began. Trade is also
growing in other non-MDB areas and in
alternative water market products such as
groundwater, unregulated seasonal water,
options, and forward contracts.
At the beginning of each growing season
(usually July or August), the local water
authority announces an initial opening
allocation of water supply. The initial allo-
cation is a percentage of an irrigator’s full
entitlement and is based on water availabil-
ity in storage areas and predicted rainfall
in catchment areas. Allocations are pro-
gressively revised during the season as,
or if, more water becomes available until
final allocations are known, normally by
February.3
3 Table A.1 in the supplementary online appendix illustrates
how end-of-season allocation levels have differed across securities,
regions, and years. Table A.1 shows that prior to the 2000s, it
was common for HS entitlement owners to receive their full
allocations. This situation changed in the drought years of the
mid 2000s. The last row of Table A.1 specifies the long-term
average annual yield (LTAAY) attached to a particular water
entitlement security in a particular region. These figures show
that on average, LS entitlement owners are only expected to
receive 100% of their water entitlements in 24–35 out of 100
years, GS entitlement owners can expect full entitlements in
64–81 years, and HS owners in 90–95 out of 100 years.
 at U
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From 2000–2009, the MDB experienced a
period of lower than average rainfall (known
as the Millennium drought), followed by
rainfall well above the long-term average in
2009–10. A large number of environmen-
tal water assets were under threat during
this period of drought, which prompted a
significant change in water policy, with the
main objective being to reallocate water
from consumptive to environmental use.
The Basin Plan set a limit of 2,750 giga-liter
(GL) for water recovery by 2019, repre-
senting 20% in current diversion limits for
surface water at the Basin scale. One of the
policies put in place was the Restoring the
Balance (RtB) program that was imple-
mented under the Australian Government’s
national Water for the Future program (DoE
2014). The Australian Commonwealth ini-
tially committed AUD $3.1 billion to the
RtB program between 2007-08 and 2016-17,
to buy back water entitlements from will-
ing water holders. Additional funding of
up to AUD $310 million per annum from
2014–15 was pledged to bridge any remain-
ing gap of required water to be returned
to the environment under the final MDB
Plan.
Willing water sellers offer non-binding
expressions of interest to the federal gov-
ernment, with offers assessed on the basis
of “value for money” (e.g., taking into con-
sideration the securing of a license, area,
price, and volume offered). The buy-back
of water entitlements from irrigators is gen-
erally accepted as being the most effective
and efficient way to recover water for the
environment in comparison to other strate-
gies such as upgrading irrigation on- and
off-farm infrastructure (Crase, O’Keefe,
and Kinoshota 2012). Considerable research
explores the implications of selling water
entitlements in the Australian irrigation
sector. Wheeler and Cheesman (2013) esti-
mated that by the start of 2012, 20% of
the irrigator population in the MDB had
sold permanent water to the Australian
Commonwealth. Of the irrigators who
had sold water, 60% had sold part of their
water entitlements and were still farming,
30% had sold all of their water and had
exited farming, and 10% had sold all of
their water and were still farming. It was
also found that 94% of the irrigators who
stayed farming after selling water kept their
water delivery entitlements (Wheeler and
Cheesman 2013).
Price Elasticity Literature Review
To estimate the demand for irrigation water,
it is necessary to obtain an estimate of the
marginal value (such as estimating price
elasticities) that farmers place on irrigation
water. Elasticity estimates are sensitive to the
method used to estimate them, depending on
if they are econometric studies, mathemati-
cal programming, or field studies. Irrigation
water demand elasticities are more elastic
than residential water demand elasticities,
as shown by econometric and mathematical
modeling (Scheierling, Loomis, and Young
2006). Most of the literature on irrigator
water values tends to be derived from pro-
gramming models (e.g., Appels, Douglas, and
Dwyer 2004; Howitt, Watson, and Adams
1980), and has concentrated upon temporary
water demand price elasticity rather than
water entitlement demand price elasticity. In
addition, the lack of information on individu-
als’ explicit demand for water has meant that
most estimates of elasticity have only consid-
ered average prices paid (e.g., Schoengold,
Sunding, and Moreno 2006). Scheierling,
Loomis, and Young (2006) reviewed 24
studies of price elasticity of demand for
temporary irrigation water and report esti-
mates ranging from −0.001 to −1.97, with
a mean of −0.48. Schoengold, Sunding, and
Moreno (2006) decomposed price elasticity
into the direct effect of water management
and the indirect effect of water price on
choice of output and irrigation technology,
and reported an elasticity estimate of −0.79.
Consistent with international findings,
estimates of Australian price elasticities
based on mathematical programming find
the demand for seasonal irrigation water to
be very inelastic at low prices (Jayasuriya,
Crean, and Hannah 2001). From an analy-
sis of large-scale farm survey information
for a variety of agricultural industries, Bell
et al. (2007) report water demand elastic-
ities from −0.8 to −1.9. Broadacre (larger
scale crop) industries were more responsive
to water prices than horticultural indus-
tries. Using water market trade data for
the Goulburn Murray Irrigated District in
Australia, Wheeler et al. (2008b) estimated
price elasticities using a) bid demand and
supply data (offers for water, not actual
prices paid or received) for seasonal water
from 2001 to 2007, and b) actual prices paid
from 1997 to 2007. These authors found a
bid price elasticity of demand of −1.51, and
 at U
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a bid price elasticity of supply of 0.89 for the
period 2001 to 2007; while using actual prices
paid, the study found a short-run demand
elasticity of −0.52, which was very similar to
that found in Scheierling, Loomis, and Young
(2006).
In addition, using demand and supply
bids and offer curves for water allocations,
Brooks and Harris (2008) estimated an
average demand elasticity at −3.20, and
an average supply elasticity at 3.50 for the
Greater Goulburn trading area. Wheeler
et al. (2008a) is the only identified study that
has attempted to estimate the price elasticity
of permanent water entitlements, and found
that the lack of available trading information
resulted in a statistically insignificant price
coefficient. One of the issues these authors
encountered is the endogenous nature of
prices and quantity demanded, especially
in time-series models (e.g., Wheeler et al.
2008b) that need to be controlled for and
corrected.
In terms of using other methods to value
water, there is a growing number of stated
preference studies: Bakopoulou, Polyzos, and
Kungolos (2010) in Greece; Chandrasekaran,
Devarajulu, and Kuppannan (2009) in south-
ern India; Calatrava and Sayadi (2005) in
Spain; and Salman and Al-Karablieh (2004)
in Jordan. Although a wide variety of choice
experiment studies indirectly feature irri-
gation, they do not derive marginal values
of irrigation water (e.g., Barkmann et al.
2008; Hope 2006). Exceptions to this include
Rigby, Alcon, and Burton (2010) in south-
ern Spain; Kunimitsu (2006) in Japan; and
Crase, Dollery, and Lockwood (2002) in
Australia.
In summary, although there has been
considerable research on temporary water
demand, there have been no studies that we
are aware of that have sought to estimate the
price elasticity of permanent water demand
and supply. Our study was designed to over-
come these statistical issues by designing an
experiment to collect a range of offer and
supply bids for water entitlements by all sur-
veyed farmers across the MDB. This allows
us to: a) collect a significant number of water
entitlement bid and offer observations and
link these to other farm and farmer informa-
tion; and b) avoid endogeneity problems that
characterize aggregate time-series modeling
on water prices with prices and quantities
traded simultaneously determined in the
water market.
Methodology
A survey was designed to collect how much
water entitlements individual irrigators would
buy and sell in response to different prices.
A variety of methods to collect these stated
preferences were first tried in exploratory
research (e.g., using a choice experiment
framework) before settling on directly
eliciting responses as a form of contingent
behavior. Data for the empirical analysis
were collected using a mailed survey to irri-
gators in 2011, which was augmented through
links to individual irrigator information in an
existing 2010 dataset, reported in Wheeler
et al. (2012). The irrigators participated in a
telephone survey the previous year, with the
information collected that year supplement-
ing the mail-out survey results. The mail-out
survey consisted of a variety of questions on
water trading, farm production, and general
water and rural issues in the MDB.4 The
design was informed by focus groups with
randomly sampled irrigators in SA and Vic-
toria, and from in-depth pre-test interviews
with individual irrigators across the MDB.
After two mail reminders and personal
phone calls to those who did not respond to
the final mail-out, the response rate was 63%
(after removing those who had left farming),
resulting in a sample size of 535 irrigators.5
Contingent Behavior Approach
We chose a contingent behavior approach
that employed a matching exercise between
price demanded/offered and volume offered/
demanded for different types of water enti-
tlements. The contingent behavior approach
is frequently used in studies valuing envi-
ronmental or recreational goods (e.g.,
Adamowicz et. al. 1997; Alberini, Zanatta,
and Rosato 2007; Haener, Boxall, and
Adamowicz 2001). Krueger and Kuziemko
(2013) recently used a similar approach
4 A copy of the survey is included in the supplementary online
appendix for interested readers.
5 Although a response rate of 63% compares very favorably to
other mail-out surveys in the published literature, non-response is
a serious issue that undermines statistical results if non-response
is not random. A comparison was made between all respondents
(e.g., the telephone survey dataset and the mail-out survey
dataset) and other measures of the irrigator population in terms
of state distribution, age, irrigated area, and water entitlement
ownership. The comparison reveals that the main characteristics
of the respondents are very similar to the irrigator population;
hence, the chances of non-response bias are reduced. Please refer
to the supplementary online appendix for further details.
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to study the demand for a private market
good (health insurance) among uninsured
Americans. Water entitlements are a market
good in Australia, hence trade is “familiar”
to respondents. Irrigators were asked the
following question:
“We would now like you to think about dif-
ferent high security and low/general security
permanent water entitlement prices in your
region and your participation in the water
market today. Below we will present you with
a range of $/ML. For each price we would like
you to indicate how many ML of each type
of permanent water entitlements you would
buy today [in 2010–11]6 for your farm (or do
nothing).”
An example was provided in the survey
(see figures A.1 and A.2 in the supplemen-
tary online appendix). The irrigators were
presented with two lists of ten prices on a
payment card (one column was for HS and
one column was for GS/LS water entitle-
ments) and asked to fill in how much (e.g., in
mega-liter; ML) of each type of entitlement
they would buy at each corresponding price.
Respondents were then asked the same type
of question, but for selling water entitlements
instead. Irrigators were asked to only com-
plete the selling column relevant for them for
water security ownership.7 This information
gave us a maximum of 5,350 total observa-
tions, although not every observation was
used for elasticity estimates due to missing
values and the fact that some irrigators did
not own any high, general, or low security
water entitlements.
It should be noted that there are a number
of potential issues8 with the payment card
6 Because there can be quite lengthy transfer times associated
with permanent water sales, it is very possible that thewater cannot
be used until the following season. Trading water entitlements is
usually associated with long-term planning for the farm, rather
than short-term needs in the current season.
7 This was verified from entries in the survey.
8 Mitchell and Carson (1981) first proposed a payment card
approach, which performs well in a variety of settings and is the
only non-discrete choice experiment format currently receiving
widespread use. A payment card approach presents choices
to the respondents at one time, which does not require the
respondents to exert effort to formulate the matching response
and eliminates anchoring effects (Carson and Czajkowski 2014).
Range and centering biases may also be issues for the payment
card approach in contingent behavior studies. Rowe, Schulze,
and Breffle (1996) tested for these biases using versions of the
payment card that had different ranges and center values, and did
not find evidence for bias except when the payment card truncates
or does not present the upper end of the value distribution that
respondents may desire to select. It is important to note that our
study does not use a traditional payment card approach, as we
list prices and ask respondents to match quantities. Our range
of choices is from AUD $500–$5,000 /ML of HS water, which
method in contingent behavior studies, as
discussed in the literature (e.g., Thayer 1981;
Cameron and Huppert 1989; Rowe, Schulze,
and Breffle 1996; Carson and Groves 2007;
Krueger and Kuziemko 2013; Carson and
Czajkowski 2014). Since our approach has
similarities to payment card methods, it is
possible that some of the challenges with
payment cards may apply. These challenges
are often due to the fact that the approach
is commonly used with public environmen-
tal goods where respondents have limited
information about the qualities of the good
and limited or no experience with the price
of such goods. This is not the situation in
our study, as irrigators have had decades of
exposure to water markets.
Revealed Trade Data
For the purpose of comparing stated and
revealed water trade preferences, volumes
and prices of actual transactions of all past
water entitlement trade were also collected.
For the purpose of our econometric analysis,
we focused solely on the water entitlements
traded by respondents in the past two years
(2010 and 2011). These two years were both
non-drought years, with most receiving their
full water allocation (see table A.1 in the
supplementary online appendix). There were
13 actual purchases and 51 sales of HS water
entitlements in our sample of 535 irrigators.
The 13 “buy” observations provided too lit-
tle information for modeling the impact of
price on volume purchased, hence it was only
possible to combine revealed sale observa-
tions with the stated sale observations for
modeling the impact of water price on sale
volume. For respondents who did not trade
any water entitlements within the past two
years, a volume of zero and a price consisting
of the mean regional price in the respective
year was entered as their revealed trade data
observations (RP; hence, all respondents
had at least two RP observations examined
for analysis).9 These no-trade observations
covered almost all the desired and plausible values of water from
observed market transactions at the time, for both sellers and
buyers. Hence, we believe range and centering biases are not
likely to be present in our study.
9 For a robustness check, an anonymous referee suggested
using the market’s maximum regional price in the respective
year for respondents who did not trade any water entitlements.
Because the maximum price was often not available for all areas,
we used the entitlement price at the 75 percentile, which is
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Table 1. Characteristics of Irrigators Purchasing/Selling HS Water Entitlements (Stated Pref-
erence Data)
Average proportion of
Price Buy Mean buy Sell Mean sell Sell all HS water offered
(AUD $/ML) (%)a volume (ML) (%)a volume (ML) water (%)a for sale (%)
500 49 447 0.0 0 0 0
1000 32 319 0.2 10 0.2 0
1500 17 263 1 71 1 1
2000 5 133 11 128 2 6
2500 2 120 24 158 4 11
3000 0.4 17 37 222 8 20
3500 0.2 25 43 222 10 25
4000 0.2 25 52 241 13 31
4500 0.2 20 54 244 14 33
5000 0.2 20 71 286 26 50
Note: Superscript adenotes that the percentage figures for buy and for sale are based on the total sample of 535 respondents, and all the 418 irriga-
tors who own any HS water entitlements, respectively.
indicate that the price was not high enough
to induce those sellers to enter the water
entitlement market in those years. Since the
revealed trade data are individual observa-
tions, individual volume will be too small
to influence the market price and hence
price is still considered as exogenous in the
equation with volume as the dependent
variable.
Combining the revealed and stated trade
data allowed us to examine whether the
hypothetical volume to be sold was under- or
overstated by irrigators under the same cir-
cumstances. However, it should be noted that
even 51 revealed sale records offer relatively
little information on the variation of volume
and they only accounted for 5% of the total
revealed sale observations (1,070 over the
two years). Therefore, the results regarding
the revealed sale data should be treated with
caution.
An alternative for comparing the stated
and revealed water sale preferences is
the ex post statistical calibration method
(e.g., Fox et al. 1998; List and Shogren
1998; 2002; Bernheim et al. 2013). Ex post
calibration seeks to establish a statistical
relationship between stated and revealed
preferences and uses the former as a pre-
dictor of the latter. This option is explored
further below.
market-price-information). This sensitivity check of the elasticity
estimates was very close to the mean price results, hence we
just report the mean price results.
Overview and Sensitivity Testing of the Stated
Preference Data
The consistency of the stated preference
(SP) data was examined to ensure that our
individuals responded to price levels in a
manner consistent with theory. Responses
to price levels should resemble the pattern
shown in table A.2 in the supplementary
online appendix, namely, irrigators could
either buy or sell zero water entitlements
at all of the ten price levels specified in the
survey, but once they buy or sell any volume,
the law of demand/supply must apply. Only
one irrigator’s purchase response was found
to be non-monotonic.10 There were a fur-
ther five irrigators who indicated they would
both buy and sell at the same price level. The
very small number of inconsistent responses
suggests evidence of valid response to the
instrument.11
Tables 1 and 2 present the initial results
on irrigators’ buying and selling responses to
prices. Almost half (49%) of the irrigators
who answered our survey in 2011–12 stated
they would buy some HS water entitlements
if the price was AUD $500/ML. When the
price increased to AUD $3,000/ML, there
were only two irrigators who would buy
any HS water, and only one irrigator would
10 The irrigator indicated a purchase of 1,000ML of HS water
at the price of AUD $500/ML; 2,000ML at the price of $1,000/ML;
50ML at the price of $1,500/ML, and 0 ML for higher prices.
11 Sensitivity testing was conducted by dropping these individ-
uals from the analysis, and given that the results did not change,
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Table 2. Characteristics of Irrigators Purchasing/Selling LS and GS Water Entitlements
(Stated Preference Data)
Victoria LS NSW GS
Price Buy Mean buy Sell Mean sell Buy Mean buy Sell Mean sell
(AUD $/ML) (%)a volume (ML) (%)a volume (%)b volume (%)b volume (ML)
300 6 293 2 119 22 986 1 40
600 2 88 4 161 14 785 1 45
900 1 73 5 183 05 1381 11 1020
1200 0.4 10 6 187 01 10000 21 1217
1500 0.4 10 10 632 0 0 31 1146
1800 0.4 10 12 594 0 0 41 1081
2100 0.4 4 16 467 0 0 46 1068
2400 0 0 18 423 0 0 47 1168
2700 0 0 19 416 0 0 47 1171
3000 0 0 28 328 0 0 54 1288
Notes: Superscript adenotes that the percentage figures for purchase and sale of LS water entitlements are based on the total Victorian sample of
205, and of these, those who own any LS water (146). Superscript bdenotes that the percentage figures for purchase and sale of GS water is based
on all the total NSW sample of 176, and those NSW irrigators who own GS water (140).
buy if the price further increased to AUD
$3,500/ML and beyond. On the selling side,
no one would sell any HS water at the price
of AUD $500/ML. Only one irrigator would
sell if the price increased to AUD $1,000/ML.
When the price was at AUD $4,000/ML,
more than half (52%) of the irrigators would
sell some HS water. Due to the small number
of irrigators who would buy at high prices
and sell at low prices, price levels above (and
including) AUD $3,000/ML were excluded
from our purchasing volume models; while
price levels below (and including) AUD
$1,000/ML were excluded in the volume
selling models.12 In addition, table 1 also
suggests that only 26% of irrigators would
sell all their HS water entitlements at the
maximum price specified in the survey, AUD
$5,000, and the average proportion of HS
water offered for sale is 50%, which is sub-
stantial. At the prevailing HS water market
price during 2010–11 (below AUD $3,000),
less than 10% of irrigators would be willing
to sell all their water.
Few irrigators would buy any low reliabil-
ity water entitlements at the prices specified
in the SP data, even at the lowest price
of AUD $300/ML. Even when the price
increased to levels well above the existing
current market price for low reliability water
entitlements, there were still not a large pro-
portion of irrigators selling. The supply side
12 If all the price points were included, the panel tobit model
does not converge due to a lack of variation of volume above
AUD $2,500/ML in the purchase model and below $1,500/ML
in the sale model.
for low reliability water entitlements was as
weak as the demand side.
No irrigators would buy any GS water
entitlements if the price reached AUD $1,500
and beyond. On the supply side, only when
the price reaches AUD $900/ML are there
significantly more irrigators willing to sell
their GS water.
Regression Models and Results
The dependent variable in each of our
models includes a large number of zero
observations and thus was a continuous
random variable over strictly positive val-
ues. Ordinary Least Squares was not used
in our analyses as it would fail to account
for the qualitative difference between the
zero and non-zero observations. The tobit
model (Tobin 1958) is a standard method
to cope with the problem of zero observa-
tions and is often referred to as a censored
regression model.13 However, since multiple
responses from each irrigator are observed,
13 The positive volumes to be bought or sold could be considered
as outcomes after a first step, where irrigators decide whether
to buy or sell. Under this two-step decision making assumption,
the Heckman two equation sample selection model would be
appropriate. However, in the context of our SP exercise, irrigators
are likely to make the trade and volume decisions simultaneously
and thus the same set of independent variables would influence
whether an irrigator trades and how much to trade. The tobit
model is regarded as more appropriate in this case. Nevertheless,
we employed the Heckman model as a sensitivity check and
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Buy Volume Model (2)a Sell Volume Model (6)b
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Buy water volume (1000ML) 0.08 0.48 0 10 – – – –
Sell water volume (1000ML) – – – – 0.07 0.24 0 8
Water Entitlement Price
(AUD$/in 1000ML)








– – – – 2.54 1.68 0 5
Age (years) 55.27 10.94 24 83 55.44 10.91 23 85
Low education dummy
(1= year 10 and below,
0=otherwise)
0.14 0.35 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Total HS water entitlement
(in 1000ML)
0.31 0.86 0 14.5 0.38 0.91 0 14.5
Carry-over volume in 2011
(in 1000ML)
0.31 0.59 0 7.1 0.23 0.53 0 7.1
Irrigated area (in 1000 ha) 0.17 0.34 0 4 0.13 0.28 0 4
Farm net income (AUD$ in
1000)
35.78 36.54 0 100 33.28 34.72 0 100
% of irrigated area with
horticulture
28.76 42.71 0 100 34.38 44.84 0 100
% of irrigated area with dairy 20.98 36.23 0 100 22.47 37.08 0 100
% of irrigated area with
broadacre
32.25 42.47 0 100 25.34 38.97 0 100
Private diverter (1= if
irrigator is a private
diverter, 0= irrigation
district)
0.13 0.34 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1
VIC (1=Victoria,
0=otherwise)
0.38 0.49 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
SA (1=South Australia,
0=otherwise)
0.29 0.45 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
Notes: Superscript aindicates model (2) in table 4; bindicates model (6) in table 4; cindicates price and RP observation dummy (1 if the observation
is RP and 0 otherwise) interaction; dindicates price and SP dummy (1 if the observation is SP data and 0 otherwise) interaction.
we employed a random effects panel tobit
model (Greene 2008).14
Price and other variables that are hypoth-
esized to impact the demand and supply of
water entitlements are gathered in the vector
of independent variables. Other indepen-
dent variables included a selected range of
irrigator characteristics such as age, edu-
cation, state of residence, being a private
14 As a robustness check, we also used a pooled tobit model
with clustered standard errors at the individual irrigator level
to account for the fact that each irrigator provided multiple
price-volume observations. The results do not differ from those
of the panel tobit models, and are made available in table A.5
in the supplementary online appendix.
diverter, water entitlement ownership, irri-
gated area size, net farm income, type of
agricultural industry, and water carry-over
from the previous year. Table 3 provides
descriptive statistics. Note that price is the
only independent variable that varies both
across irrigators and panels, while all other
independent variables vary across irriga-
tors only. Although there has been a lack of
studies estimating the price elasticity of water
entitlements, these independent variables
have been found important in influencing
water entitlement trade choices in general
(Wheeler et al. 2008a; 2010; 2012). Six depen-
dent variables were investigated: HS water
entitlement volume sold; HS water bought;
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Table 4. Tobit Estimation Results for Modeling HS Water Entitlement Trade (Linear-
Linear)
Stated preference SP and Revealed
(SP) data Preference (RP)
Buy volume Sell volume Sell volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water price −1.06∗∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
Price_stated 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
Price_revealed 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
Age −0.02∗∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗∗
Low education −0.31∗ −0.11∗ −0.11∗
Total HS water entitlement 0.01 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
Carry-over volume 0.08 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Irrigated area 0.38∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
Farm net income 0.003∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗∗
% horticulture 0.001 0.0002 −0.0001
% dairy 0.002 −0.0003 −0.001
% broadacre 0.003∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗
Private diverter 0.32∗∗ 0.06 0.04
VICa 0.30∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
SA 0.13 0.26∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
constant 0.17∗∗ 0.58∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗ −1.03∗∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗
Wald Chi-2 421∗∗∗ 453∗∗∗ 901∗∗∗ 929∗∗∗ 1086∗∗∗ 1104∗∗∗
Bayesian Information
Criterion
2373 2349 1958 1897 2484 2351
Likelihood-ratio test for the
panel-level variance
component equal to zero
508∗∗∗ 403∗∗∗ 1435∗∗∗ 996∗∗∗ 1247∗∗∗ 866∗∗∗
Observations 2675 2535 3344 3168 4299 4055
Uncensored obs. 563 558 1220 1184 1271 1234
Notes: Superscript aindicates the reference state is NSW; ∗p< 0.1, ∗∗p< 0.05, and ∗∗∗p< 0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
GS water volume sold; GS water bought; LS
water volume sold; and LS water volume
bought.
Results on HS Water Entitlements
The results of the panel tobit random effects
models for HS water entitlements are
presented in tables 4 (linear-linear form)
and 5 (linear-log).15 The likelihood-ratio
(LR) test for the panel-level variance com-
ponent equal to zero was rejected at the 1%
significance level, suggesting that the data
are more appropriately fit by a panel rather
than a pooled model.16 In each table, models
15 There was no prior expectation on the appropriate functional
form used to model volume and price; hence, we undertook
sensitivity analysis by modeling a variety of specifications (though
it was not possible to test log-log as we could not take logarithms
of a dependent variable that contains a large amount of zero
values). Given the varying model statistics for demand and supply,
we decided to compare two functional forms: linear-linear and
linear-log.
16 The random-effects model was calculated using quadrature,
which is an approximation and its accuracy partially depends
(1) and (3) are the impact of price only on
demand and supply, respectively. Models
(2) and (4) are the models for demand and
supply with a range of other independent
variables, and the remaining models are
for supply only, including RP and SP price
data only (model 5), and RP/SP data with
a full set of other variables (model 6). The
independent variables in models (2), (4),
and (6) are not significantly correlated. The
highly significant coefficient estimates of
water price are robust with and without the
inclusion of other covariates, suggesting that
price is uncorrelated with other covariates,
as expected since price was exogenously
assigned. Higher prices are associated with
lower purchase volumes and higher sale vol-
umes. When using combined SP and RP data,
on the number of integration points used. When the choice of
quadrature points does not significantly affect the outcome, the
coefficients should not change by more than a relative difference
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Table 5. Tobit Estimation Results for Modeling HS Water Entitlement Trade (Linear-Log)
Stated preference (SP) data SP and RP
Buy volume Sell volume Sell volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln_water pricea −1.08∗∗∗ −0.97∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
ln_price_statedb 0.56∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
ln_price_revealedc 0.54∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗∗
Low education −0.31∗∗∗ −0.11∗ −0.11∗
Total HS water entitlement 0.02 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
Carry-over volume 0.09 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Irrigated area 0.35∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
Farm net income 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗∗
% horticulture 0.002 0.0002 −0.0001
% dairy 0.002∗ −0.0003 −0.0006
% broadacre 0.003∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗
Private diverter 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06 0.04
VICd 0.24∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
SA 0.10 0.26∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
constant 6.40∗∗∗ 6.07∗∗∗ −6.24∗∗∗ −6.32∗∗∗ −4.81∗∗∗ −4.84∗∗∗
Wald Chi-2 433∗∗∗ 502∗∗∗ 882∗∗∗ 916∗∗∗ 942∗∗∗ 971∗∗∗
Bayesian Information
Criterion
2430 2580 1887 1827 2674 2539
Likelihood-ratio test for the
panel-level variance
component equal to zero
489∗∗∗ 212∗∗∗ 1459∗∗∗ 1016∗∗∗ 1149∗∗∗ 788∗∗∗
Observations 2675 2535 3344 3168 4299 4055
Uncensored obs. 563 558 1220 1184 1271 1234
Notes: Superscript aindicates logarithm of the price of HS water; bindicates ln_price and SP dummy (1 if the observation is SP data; 0 otherwise)
interaction; cindicates ln_price and RP observation dummy (1 if the observation is RP; 0 otherwise) interaction; dindicates that the reference state is
NSW; p< 0.1, ∗∗p< 0.05, and ∗∗∗p< 0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
we can only model the impact of revealed
sale on volume through an intercept shift
dummy variable, or include an interaction
term between this dummy and price. Ide-
ally, both the intercept dummy and price
interaction need to be included and tested
for significance, but they are highly corre-
lated (hence are not statistically significant
if included together). The results suggest
that the marginal effect of price is smaller
for sale volumes in the RP data than the SP
data. The smaller effect of price in the RP
data might arise from the smaller price range
of RP data, making it unlikely to observe a
large response of volume on price. However,
this difference should be treated with caution
since we have not controlled for RP trade as
an intercept.
In terms of choice of functional form, both
linear-linear and linear-log specifications pro-
vided highly significant coefficient estimates
for price and exhibited a good overall fit.
The BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion)
was used to select the “best” functional form.
The linear-linear functional form was chosen
for the demand model, and linear-log was
chosen for the supply models.
It is interesting to observe that a few inde-
pendent variables have the same positive
or negative impact on both water volume
bought and sold, suggesting that irrigators
who trade (either buy or sell) HS water may
have similar characteristics. For example,
irrigators’ age and low education levels are
negatively associated with both volumes
to buy and sell; and farm net income is
positively associated with both buy and sale
volumes. One key difference is that HS water
ownership and carry-over volumes are only
significant in the water supply model. The
higher the volume of water entitlements
owned by the irrigator, and the higher their
carry-over volume from the previous season
(which indicates surplus water factors), the
higher the water volume offered for sale. The
percentage of irrigated area with horticul-
ture or dairy grazing variables is statistically
insignificant, while the percentage of irrigated
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Table 6. HS Water Entitlement Price Elasticities in the Southern MDB
Linear-linear Linear-log
Price ($/ML) Buy (SP)a Sell (SP)a Sell (RP)a Buy (SP)b Sell (SP)b Sell (RP)b
1,700 −0.53 [0.02]c 0.27 [0.01] 0.15 [0.02] −0.32 [0.01] 0.41 [0.02] 0.35 [0.02]
1,800 −0.55 [0.02] 0.28 [0.01] 0.16 [0.02] −0.31 [0.01] 0.41 [0.02] 0.36 [0.02]
1,900 −0.57 [0.02] 0.30 [0.01] 0.17 [0.03] −0.31 [0.01] 0.42 [0.02] 0.36 [0.02]
2,000 −0.59 [0.02] 0.32 [0.01] 0.18 [0.03] −0.31 [0.01] 0.42 [0.02] 0.37 [0.02]
2,100 −0.60 [0.02] 0.34 [0.01] 0.19 [0.03] −0.30 [0.01] 0.43 [0.02] 0.37 [0.02]
Notes: Superscript aindicates Buy (SP) elasticity estimates are based on the regression in column (1) of table 4. Sell (SP) and Sell (RP) elasticity
estimates are based on the regression in column (5) of table 4. Superscript bindicates Buy (SP) elasticity estimates are based on the regression in
column (1) of table 5. Sell (SP) and Sell (RP) elasticity estimates are based on the regression in column (5) of table 5. Superscript cindicates that
standard errors are estimated by the delta method and are shown in square parentheses.
area with broadacre crops is positively sig-
nificant in the demand model and negatively
significant in the supply model. This suggests
that broadacre irrigators demand more water
entitlements while supplying less, everything
else being equal. This result is not surprising,
as crops such as rice and cotton require large
amounts of water.
The coefficient estimates of price pre-
sented previously represent the marginal
effects on the latent variable y∗i (equation 5).
However, elasticity estimates of price on
the conditional dependent variable yi | yi > 0
may be of more interest given our interest in
the response of the observed positive water
volume to changes in prices. Price elastic-
ity estimates change with respect to price
levels in the tobit model. Table 6 estimates
price elasticity for a condensed price level
range (at $100 intervals around the mean
price for HS water entitlements in 2010–11;
AUD $1,900/ML (NWC 2011b)) for both
linear-linear and linear-log functional forms.
Elasticity estimates for demand became
more inelastic from the linear-log form
while, for supply, they became less inelastic.
Again, elasticity estimates for RP need to be
treated with caution as they are based on the
coefficient estimates of price_revealed and
ln_price_revealed in the regression results
reported in column (5) of tables 4 and 5,
respectively.17
In addition to the price elasticities for
different types of water entitlements, we
report elasticity estimates for several sub-
samples for HS water in table 7. Due to
17 We also calculated the price elasticity of supply based on
a regression using RP as an intercept dummy. The elasticity
estimates for both SP and RP are very close to the estimates in
the “Sell (SP)” column.
space limits, elasticity estimates are cal-
culated from the linear-linear functional
form for demand and the linear-log form
for supply. The following farm charac-
teristics are associated with a lower price
elasticity of demand for irrigators: having
a low education level; being aged 55 and
over; residing in NSW; having a smaller
irrigated area; and having a larger area
under horticultural production. Price elas-
ticity of supply (SP) is generally more
elastic than the mean for the following cat-
egories: irrigators aged 40 and younger;
irrigated area being mainly in broadacre;
NSW farmers; and a larger farm irrigated
area.
Wheeler, Zuo, and Hughes (2014),
using actual water allocation market data
and farms’ financial return data from
the Australian Bureau of Agricultural
and Resource Economics and Sciences
(ABARES), found that the marginal impact
of one additional ML of water allocation sale
(from 2006/07 to 2010/11) for horticulture,
broadacre, and dairy industries, respectively,
was AUD $632, $465, and $219. Estimates of
the cost of one more ML of water allocation
purchase were $240, $125, and $81 for the
horticulture, broadacre, and dairy industries,
respectively. The value of foregone produc-
tion (and additional production) from one
unit of water sale (purchase) is clearly the
highest for perennial crops and lowest for
annual crops (i.e., pasture, rice, and cotton).
Such results partly reflect the fact that annual
producers’ use of irrigation water is more
flexible (in terms of substituting other inputs
for water use, such as feeding cows barley
instead of watering pasture, and broadacre
farmers can choose to not produce and sell
their water allocations) versus perennial
crops that are high value and permanent
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Table 7. Estimates of Purchase and Sell HS Water Price Elasticities, by Irrigator and Farm
Characteristics
Buy (SP)a Sell (SP)a Sell (RP)a
All −0.57 [0.02]b 0.42 [0.02] 0.36 [0.02]
Education level year 10 and below −0.46 [0.07] 0.49 [0.05] 0.49 [0.06]
Education level higher than year 10 −0.59 [0.03] 0.41 [0.02] 0.35 [0.02]
Age 40 and younger −0.69 [0.08] 0.61 [0.06] 0.58 [0.07]
Age 55 and older −0.53 [0.03] 0.37 [0.02] 0.30 [0.02]
Irrigated area in bottom quartile −0.54 [0.05] 0.45 [0.04] 0.43 [0.04]
Irrigated area in top quartile −0.67 [0.05] 0.53 [0.04] 0.49 [0.04]
% of area in horticulture is 50% or above −0.54 [0.05] 0.35 [0.03] 0.30 [0.03]
% of area in dairy is 50% or above −0.60 [0.05] 0.43 [0.03] 0.34 [0.03]
% of area in broadacre is 50% or above −0.61 [0.04] 0.53 [0.04] 0.51 [0.05]
Private diverter −0.60 [0.07] 0.46 [0.05] 0.41 [0.06]
Irrigation district diverter −0.56 [0.03] 0.43 [0.02] 0.38 [0.02]
NSW −0.52 [0.04] 0.52 [0.05] —c
VIC −0.67 [0.04] 0.49 [0.03] 0.43 [0.03]
SA −0.57 [0.05] 0.35 [0.03] 0.31 [0.03]
Notes: Superscript aindicates that Buy (SP) elasticity estimates are based on the regression in col. (1) of table 4, estimated separately for each sub-
sample. Sell (SP) and Sell (RP) elasticity estimates are based on the regression in column (5) of table 5, estimated separately for each subsamples.
Superscript bindicates that standard errors are estimated by the delta method and are shown in square parentheses. Superscript cindicates there are
no uncensored revealed trade observations in NSW.
and take time to change production systems.
This also explains our experimental water
entitlement results, with horticultural farmers
having the lowest price elasticity of water
entitlement demand and dairy and broadacre
producers having higher price elasticity of
supply.
Calibration of Supply for HS Water
For robustness checks, we compared the
stated and revealed water sale preferences
using an ex post statistical calibration
approach. The following regression was
estimated:
(1) YRPi = α + βYSPi + εi
where YRPi is the revealed volume of HS
water sold by an irrigator at a given price
level, YSPi is the stated volume of HS water
that an irrigator would sell given the same
price level, α and β are parameters to be
estimated, and εi is the classical error term
(Bernheim et al. 2013). For perfect calibra-
tion, the parameter α will be zero and β will
be 1, indicating that an irrigator’s volume
for sale from the SP survey instrument is the
same as the past revealed volume sold given
the same price.18 The calibration regression
18 It should be noted that it is difficult to observe the same or
similar revealed and stated volumes of water sale under the same
was run using a database of actual sale trans-
actions (including volumes and prices) for the
period 2008 to 2011 from the RtB program
operated by the Department of Environment
(DoE). In order to have a time background
similar to our SP survey, 360 sale records of
HS water entitlements from this database
in 2010 and 2011 were used for calibration.
As our SP sample and the DoE sample con-
sist of different irrigators, we undertook an
approach to match the revealed sale volume
from the DoE dataset with a stated sale vol-
ume from our SP dataset. First, we divided
the SP sample into four groups based on
their HS water ownership so that the first
group’s HS water ownership lies within the
first quartile of the HS water ownership of
the DoE sample, the second group within the
second quartile, and so forth. This was done
to ensure that the matched stated volume is
from irrigators with comparable HS water
ownership since, in addition to price, own-
ership is the most important influence that
determines how much volume an irrigator is
willing to sell. Second, for each transaction
of the 360 DoE sale records, we identified
the closest price in the SP sample. For exam-
ple, if the price of a transaction in the DoE
dataset is AUD $1,800/ML and the volume
price since irrigators have a limited supply of water entitlements
and, once they sell all of their water, they are not able to state that
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is 15MLs, the closest price in the SP dataset
is AUD $2,000/ML (the price points in the
SP dataset are from AUD $500 to $5,000 at
intervals of $500). The HS water ownership
of the irrigator associated with this trans-
action falls in the first quartile. Under the
price of AUD $2,000/ML, the average vol-
ume offered for sale by the irrigators in the
first group (matched with the first quartile)
of the SP sample is calculated as 33.8MLs.
Hence, for this record at the price of AUD
$2,000/ML, the revealed volume is 15MLs
and the stated volume is 33.8MLs.
The calibration result indicates that βˆ is
0.80 (SE= 0.06) and αˆ is 7.18 (SE= 10.88),
with a regression R2 of 0.28. An F-test of
the null hypothesis (βˆ= 1 and αˆ= 0 jointly)
suggests that it can be rejected at the 1%
significance level, suggesting that irrigators
overstated the volume for sale in the SP
survey: if the stated volume were 1ML, the
revealed volume would be 0.8ML (25%
overstatement).
We further divided the DoE sample into
two groups: those who sold part of their
water entitlements (265 transaction records)
and those who sold all their water (95 trans-
action records). For the first group, βˆ is 0.78
(SE= 0.08) and αˆ is 6.73 (SE= 12.91), with
a regression R2 of 0.28. An F-test of the null
hypothesis (βˆ= 1 and αˆ= 0 jointly) still sug-
gests that the null hypothesis can be soundly
rejected. Hence, the stated volume is still
an overstatement for farmers selling part
of their water entitlements. For the second
group, βˆ is 0.87 (SE= 0.13) and αˆ is 7.10
(SE= 20.32), with a regression R2 of 0.33.
An F-test of the null hypothesis (βˆ= 1 and
αˆ= 0 jointly) suggests that the null cannot be
rejected at the 10% significance level. Hence,
the stated volume is not a significant over-
statement of the revealed volume for farmers
who sold all their water entitlements, unlike
for farmers who only sold part of their water.
In our sample, less than 10% of irrigators
would be willing to sell all their water at the
prevailing market price in 2010. This implies
that most irrigators overstate the volume for
sale in the SP exercise since most are only
willing to sell part of their water.
Given that the calibration parameter βˆ
is estimated as 0.80 overall, this suggests
a smaller actual price elasticity of supply.
Mathematically, to derive the actual price
elasticity using the calibration approach
one must multiply the stated price elasticity
estimated previously by 0.80. For example,
at the AUD $1,900 level, the stated price
elasticity of supply is 0.42 and hence the
actual price elasticity after calibration is 0.34,
which is even more inelastic and closer to the
estimate of 0.36 from the RP data.
GS and LS Water
The results for GS (NSW) and LS (VIC)
entitlements are presented in table A.3 in the
supplementary online appendix. Only those
models with price as the sole independent
variable are presented due to space limita-
tions, as well as this study’s focus on price.
Except for the supply model for GS that used
a linear-log functional form, all the other
models used a linear-linear model, as sug-
gested by the BIC. The coefficient estimate
on price is robust to the inclusion of other
covariates; there are only 19 uncensored
observations for the LS model, suggesting
that few irrigators are willing to purchase LS
water at the prices in our SP survey instru-
ment. There were also a relatively small
number of irrigators in NSW willing to buy
GS water entitlements. On the other hand,
irrigators are much more willing to sell their
LS or GS water.
The mean price for GS water entitlements
in the NSW Murray and Murrumbidgee irri-
gation areas in 2010–11 was AUD $940/ML,
and the mean price for LS water in northern
Victoria was AUD $155/ML (NWC 2011b).
Hence, we calculated the elasticity estimates
of price on the conditional dependent vari-
able yi | yi > 0 for GS and LS water at five
price levels around their respective means
in 2010–11 (presented in table A.4 in the
supplementary online appendix).
One can observe that demand is most
inelastic for LS, which could be due to the
fact that the price for it is so low that irri-
gators are irresponsive to price changes in
the relevant range. Supply for HS and GS
price elasticities are almost the same in their
respective relevant price range, while LS sup-
ply remains extremely inelastic. Also, only
Victorian farmers own LS water entitlements
and the size of their water ownership is less
than HS. Given the low price level and small
size of ownership of LS water, it is reason-
able to expect its supply to be extremely
inelastic. The NSW irrigators usually hold
large amounts of GS water and do receive
full water allocations up to 90% of the time,
 at U
niversity of A






328 January 2016 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
which is almost the same as HS water own-
ers. Hence, the supply for GS has the same
price elasticity as for HS water, even though
the price range for GS water is much lower.
Further analysis suggests that the supply for
GS would be less price inelastic than for HS
at the HS price range.
Cost Projection of the Restoring the Balance
Program
One question of policy interest that this study
can inform is how much it would cost the
Australian Commonwealth to purchase all
the remaining water to meet the environmen-
tal targets under the RtB program. Historical
information on the DoE webpage (DoE
2014) suggests that the remaining volume
of LTAAY entitlements to be recovered
was 1155.49 GL for the three states of NSW,
VIC, and SA in the southern MDB as of
December 31, 2011. This represented almost
9% of current diversions for surface water
entitlements to be recovered.
As elaborated in figure C.1 in the supple-
mentary online appendix, if all the 1155.49
GL remaining were purchased as HS water
by the government,19 our supply curve sug-
gests a price around AUD $3,623/ML.20
However, since the calibration indicates that
irrigators are likely to overstate the amount
of water for sale, a conservative estimate
from the calibrated supply curve results in a
price around AUD $4,154/ML, with a total
cost to purchase 1155.49 GL of AUD $4.8
billion. Table 8 presents the projected cost
for this under Option One.
Considering that the total budget for water
buyback is up to AUD $4.03 billion, it is not
feasible for the government to purchase the
remaining 1155.49 GL all at once in the form
of HS entitlements. One way to reduce the
cost would be to also purchase general secu-
rity and/or low security water entitlements,21
19 It should be noted that the current policy now plans for water
entitlements to be purchased through 2017–18. Previous modelling
by ABARES (2011) suggested that the Basin Plan would reduce
the gross value of irrigated agricultural production in the Basin
by 3.6% while the gross value of agricultural production of the
Basin would decrease by 1.7%.
20 The assumption is that the unit price paid by the government
is the same for every irrigator and equal to the marginal cost of
supplying the last unit of water by irrigators to meet the recovery
requirement.
21 It is important to note that buying LS entitlements may
partially defeat the purpose of providingwater for the environment
in the times when water is needed the most (e.g., severe droughts).
Table 8. Projected Cost for Securing the
Remaining 1155.49 GL in LTAAY in the
Southern MDB
Option 1 Buy Option 2 Buy













under which option two in table 8 estimates a
total cost of AUD $2.16 billion (details of the
calculation are explained in the supplemen-
tary online appendix). Given that AUD $2.02
billion has been spent on water buyback as
of December 31, 201122 (DoE 2011), and
that the total budget for the RtB program is
about AUD $4.03 billion, there was AUD
$2.01 billion remaining for water buyback in
MDB. Hence, our estimate of AUD $2.16
billion for the southern MDB suggests that
the government needs to manage the remain-
ing water recovery program carefully in order
to keep within budget.
Our estimates are based on a scenario
that all the remaining water will be acquired
at one time based on irrigators’ valuations
in 2011. When such a huge demand by the
government is present in the market at one
time, and the price elasticity of supply is
quite inelastic, price can rise sharply. Hence,
an approach of multiple rounds of purchase
tenders (e.g., buying water in a number of
different tenders at different times)23 could
be more effective at reducing the prices paid.
Conclusion
Stated and revealed preference water trading
data collected using a survey instrument were
The LS entitlements deliver zero allocations in times of water
scarcity, hence their benefit for environmental water is only
when extra flows are needed in times of floods and larger water
allocations, or when carry-over provisions exist.
22 We chose this figure to calculate the impact on the budget
as it represents the date that matches closely with our irrigator
survey.
23 The Australian government has been calling for multiple
rounds of water purchasing tenders since the beginning of 2008.
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used to estimate how individual irrigators in
the southern MDB may buy and sell water
entitlements in response to different prices,
thereby allowing the development of price
elasticity estimates.
There are two major contributions of the
approach employed in this study to the liter-
ature. First, the methods employed allowed
construction of price elasticities of water
entitlement supply and demand, which are
rare in the literature. The stated preference
approach in concert with fusion of actual
market trades overcomes the shortcomings of
many existing studies of elasticities that suf-
fer from scarce real market transaction data
with limited price range and endogeneity
issues.
Second, the survey instrument was val-
idated using revealed water entitlement
sale data, with the validated results suggest-
ing that the stated preference instrument
accurately predicted the revealed prefer-
ence for high security water entitlement
sales for irrigators who sell all their water;
but overestimated (by about one-quarter)
the revealed preference for irrigators who
sell part of their water. Our results indi-
cate that both demand and supply of HS
water entitlements in the southern MDB are
inelastic in the relevant market price range
between AUD from $1,700 to $2,100/ML,
while supply is relatively more inelastic than
demand. For general security and low secu-
rity water, the price elasticity of demand is
estimated to be even more inelastic than
that of HS water. The price elasticity of
supply for GS water is almost the same as
that of HS water, while the supply of LS
water is extremely inelastic. Existing litera-
ture suggests that price elasticity of demand
for water allocations in Australia ranged
from −0.52 to −1.9, and price elasticity of
supply for water allocations was 0.89. Our
estimate for demand for high security water
entitlements was around −0.57, which is at
the lower end of the range obtained from
the existing literature on price elasticity of
demand for water allocations. Our estimate
for supply for HS water entitlements was
around 0.42, or half that of water alloca-
tions. The relatively irresponsive demand
and supply for water entitlements to price
could be explained by the fact that irriga-
tors usually employ long-term plans to buy
or sell water entitlements, whereas it is a
much more flexible and temporary decision
for irrigators to buy or sell seasonal water
allocations.
Inelastic price elasticity of supply for water
entitlements suggests that price may not
be a very effective instrument to encour-
age irrigators to sell more water. Indeed,
our simulations show that if the entire
remaining water required by the Australian
Commonwealth for environmental flows
were acquired at once in 2011, it would
have been too cost prohibitive. Our find-
ings suggest that a multiple-tender approach
across years may be a more cost-effective
way of obtaining water entitlements for the
environment.
When additional water entitlement trading
data become available in the future, more
accurate calibration of the demand schedule
could be undertaken. The stated preference
survey instrument could also be used to elicit
price elasticity of demand and supply for
annual water allocations, which would be
interesting to compare with the price elastic-
ity estimates derived by other techniques in
the literature. Comparisons between water
allocation and water entitlement elasticities
would also be of significant policy interest.
Most importantly, the consistency of our
stated and revealed results provides support
for the use of this methodology in water
basins in other regions of the world.
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